Believing Politicians?
Luky doesn't bark. Malamutes generally don't. He talks, though, and man is he given me the "what for"!
He sometimes tries to type his own blog posts but he was particularly frustrated about a week ago when his big furry, bear-sized paw hit the "Insert" key instead of "Home." So he's always yelling at me to transcribe his journal notes.
I was trying to get him occupied with this week's Science Channel 25th anniversary airing of hour eight of Carl Sagan's original COSMOS series which dealt with Einstein's theory, the speed of light and time travel - one of Luky's favorite topics, of course - but it didn't work. This week his new passion is "belief" . . . that's right, the word "belief" and its various forms, and how we use these words.
Luky says the misuse of words like "belief" and "believe" constitutes one of humanity's greatest problems. He says our claims of knowledge are even worse, but there are enough humans who actually use words correctly, and therefore require that when people make claims of knowledge that the claim actually does describe a circumstance which is true - that is, a circumstance which can be verified or defined as true . . . because, as Luky says, "you can't KNOW untrue things."
"However," he says - and has liberally written about in his journal entries this week, "claims of belief are actually much more corrosive to understanding, truth, honesty, communication and 'the good' (whatever he means by that) than claims of knowledge."
I asked why, of course. At first blush it seems like a claim of knowledge is much stronger than a claim of belief.
"The problem," Luky says, "is that claims of belief are automatically perceived to be somewhat figurative, indeterminate references implying little or nothing about the object of the statement, and essentially, asserting only a rationale - like a certain condition of mental conviction."
"So, you're saying that people do harm when they make statements about their beliefs?"
Luky looked up. I suppose the tone of my response was reflecting a more-than-normal interest in his topic du jour.
"Absolutely! I've analyzed this pretty carefully and there seem to be only five and a half states of mind by which a human can host and assert a belief."
"I'm lost already, but go ahead."
"Okay," Luky cleared his throat - which can sound like a growl, so I was glad we were in the loft, "well, think about this . . . when a human makes a statement like, 'I believe in ghosts,' you tend NOT to challenge the speaker. Have you ever considered why? Anyway, even if you haven't, there's little criticism due since the speaker of such a statement is not really asserting something very bold and exciting - it's not important news that offers new information about ghosts. And the reason it's not is because it makes no attempt to promote a factual circumstance in the world. It only describes a condition about the speaker's state of mind, his mental conviction. And since you don't expect to be able to test his state of mind, you let the assertion stand."
"Ok, I think I see your point, but I don't get why that's so dangerous . . . and where are your five and half states?"
"Ok, well, the five and half states come from my analysis of the types of intention and conviction which might possibly exist when someone believes, or more accurately, says they believe, a thing - like, for example, 'in ghosts'."
"And . . . as if I need to ask . . . what are those five and a half states? And also, if I might be so bold, I was not familiar with the clinical studies on a Malamute's ability to read minds."
"It does not require reading or knowing the minds of others. It only requires logic. There are only certain conditions - like intentions or rationales - that can apply to support a human's declaration of belief. Just listen and I think you'll get it . . ." and then he added a slow snide "maybe" to which I feigned my usual pet-owner grin (that's the one where you pretend you're the boss because you control food distribution, but everyone in the room really knows you're faking it).
"The speaker," Luky began again, "declaring his belief of a thing must hold one of the following rationales, either he:
1.) truly believes for reasons that can be empirically experienced by others (i.e., verified); or,
2.) truly believes for purely personal reasons which HAVE no, and NEED no, relation to the world outside his mind; or,
3.) actually thinks, incorrectly, that he believes his statement (this circumstance often happens when the speakers interacts regularly with one community wherein he often makes such statements and hears others make such statements, and neither he nor the others ever get challenged on such statements, so declaring belief that way has always seemed acceptable and appropriate to the speaker and he's never had the inspiration or motivation to think critically about his state of mind); or,
4.) is joking (i.e., speaking falsely with no ill intent); or,
5.) is lying (i.e., speaking falsely with some ill intent)."
"Ok, so I'm not real sure what I just heard except I know that you said five and a half, and I counted only five - so at least I know something's missing." I was pretty lost to tell the truth.
"Well, yes, I was considering adding a sixth condition of mind because I think there's room for insanity as a rationale for declaring a belief . . . but then I thought that if some human were truly insane his insanity might be manifest in one or more of the options I listed (especially numbers '2' '3' or '5'), so I decided to just refer to it as a half of a condition."
Sometimes Luky's explanations are more exhausting than my not understanding!
"And you're saying that no matter what somebody . . ."
Luky interrupted, "some HUMAN!" he emphasized as if I were parsing my responses to carefully protect my own species.
"Yeah, sure, I get it - but the point is, you're telling me that when anybody says they believe something, those are the only things that can be in their minds!?!"
"Yes." He was pretty definitive.
"But what about the ghosts?" I asked. "Where are they? Do they exist? Can we find out?"
"Again," he responded with his softest, lowest voice - his words puffed out through his white wolf whiskers as if he were trying to whistle, "I just need to have patience, I guess . . . it's like this . . . when humans say they believe something, there is no necessary relationship between their state of mind and the subject of their declaration. They can say they believe in ghosts, believe in God, believe there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq . . . it doesn't matter. Their statement may or may not be true - namely that they believe - but even if it's true that they believe, it means nothing regarding the facts about the subject."
"Oh, I think I get it now," I said. "But since you mentioned it as an example, what about when Dick Cheney says he 'KNOWS' there are weapons of mass destruction?"
"I was only talking about 'humans,'" Luky said with some increased gruffness, "not politicians!"
He sometimes tries to type his own blog posts but he was particularly frustrated about a week ago when his big furry, bear-sized paw hit the "Insert" key instead of "Home." So he's always yelling at me to transcribe his journal notes.
I was trying to get him occupied with this week's Science Channel 25th anniversary airing of hour eight of Carl Sagan's original COSMOS series which dealt with Einstein's theory, the speed of light and time travel - one of Luky's favorite topics, of course - but it didn't work. This week his new passion is "belief" . . . that's right, the word "belief" and its various forms, and how we use these words.
Luky says the misuse of words like "belief" and "believe" constitutes one of humanity's greatest problems. He says our claims of knowledge are even worse, but there are enough humans who actually use words correctly, and therefore require that when people make claims of knowledge that the claim actually does describe a circumstance which is true - that is, a circumstance which can be verified or defined as true . . . because, as Luky says, "you can't KNOW untrue things."
"However," he says - and has liberally written about in his journal entries this week, "claims of belief are actually much more corrosive to understanding, truth, honesty, communication and 'the good' (whatever he means by that) than claims of knowledge."
I asked why, of course. At first blush it seems like a claim of knowledge is much stronger than a claim of belief.
"The problem," Luky says, "is that claims of belief are automatically perceived to be somewhat figurative, indeterminate references implying little or nothing about the object of the statement, and essentially, asserting only a rationale - like a certain condition of mental conviction."
"So, you're saying that people do harm when they make statements about their beliefs?"
Luky looked up. I suppose the tone of my response was reflecting a more-than-normal interest in his topic du jour.
"Absolutely! I've analyzed this pretty carefully and there seem to be only five and a half states of mind by which a human can host and assert a belief."
"I'm lost already, but go ahead."
"Okay," Luky cleared his throat - which can sound like a growl, so I was glad we were in the loft, "well, think about this . . . when a human makes a statement like, 'I believe in ghosts,' you tend NOT to challenge the speaker. Have you ever considered why? Anyway, even if you haven't, there's little criticism due since the speaker of such a statement is not really asserting something very bold and exciting - it's not important news that offers new information about ghosts. And the reason it's not is because it makes no attempt to promote a factual circumstance in the world. It only describes a condition about the speaker's state of mind, his mental conviction. And since you don't expect to be able to test his state of mind, you let the assertion stand."
"Ok, I think I see your point, but I don't get why that's so dangerous . . . and where are your five and half states?"
"Ok, well, the five and half states come from my analysis of the types of intention and conviction which might possibly exist when someone believes, or more accurately, says they believe, a thing - like, for example, 'in ghosts'."
"And . . . as if I need to ask . . . what are those five and a half states? And also, if I might be so bold, I was not familiar with the clinical studies on a Malamute's ability to read minds."
"It does not require reading or knowing the minds of others. It only requires logic. There are only certain conditions - like intentions or rationales - that can apply to support a human's declaration of belief. Just listen and I think you'll get it . . ." and then he added a slow snide "maybe" to which I feigned my usual pet-owner grin (that's the one where you pretend you're the boss because you control food distribution, but everyone in the room really knows you're faking it).
"The speaker," Luky began again, "declaring his belief of a thing must hold one of the following rationales, either he:
1.) truly believes for reasons that can be empirically experienced by others (i.e., verified); or,
2.) truly believes for purely personal reasons which HAVE no, and NEED no, relation to the world outside his mind; or,
3.) actually thinks, incorrectly, that he believes his statement (this circumstance often happens when the speakers interacts regularly with one community wherein he often makes such statements and hears others make such statements, and neither he nor the others ever get challenged on such statements, so declaring belief that way has always seemed acceptable and appropriate to the speaker and he's never had the inspiration or motivation to think critically about his state of mind); or,
4.) is joking (i.e., speaking falsely with no ill intent); or,
5.) is lying (i.e., speaking falsely with some ill intent)."
"Ok, so I'm not real sure what I just heard except I know that you said five and a half, and I counted only five - so at least I know something's missing." I was pretty lost to tell the truth.
"Well, yes, I was considering adding a sixth condition of mind because I think there's room for insanity as a rationale for declaring a belief . . . but then I thought that if some human were truly insane his insanity might be manifest in one or more of the options I listed (especially numbers '2' '3' or '5'), so I decided to just refer to it as a half of a condition."
Sometimes Luky's explanations are more exhausting than my not understanding!
"And you're saying that no matter what somebody . . ."
Luky interrupted, "some HUMAN!" he emphasized as if I were parsing my responses to carefully protect my own species.
"Yeah, sure, I get it - but the point is, you're telling me that when anybody says they believe something, those are the only things that can be in their minds!?!"
"Yes." He was pretty definitive.
"But what about the ghosts?" I asked. "Where are they? Do they exist? Can we find out?"
"Again," he responded with his softest, lowest voice - his words puffed out through his white wolf whiskers as if he were trying to whistle, "I just need to have patience, I guess . . . it's like this . . . when humans say they believe something, there is no necessary relationship between their state of mind and the subject of their declaration. They can say they believe in ghosts, believe in God, believe there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq . . . it doesn't matter. Their statement may or may not be true - namely that they believe - but even if it's true that they believe, it means nothing regarding the facts about the subject."
"Oh, I think I get it now," I said. "But since you mentioned it as an example, what about when Dick Cheney says he 'KNOWS' there are weapons of mass destruction?"
"I was only talking about 'humans,'" Luky said with some increased gruffness, "not politicians!"
posted by RAM at 9:23 AM
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